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Karol Wojtyla's Notion of the Irreducible in Man and the Quest for a Just World Order
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In January 1975 I delivered a lecture on “The Dialectical Conception of Self-determination” at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. In my presentation I tried to explain the specific form of philosophical anthropology which Karol Wojtyła had developed, using the phenomenological method for a creative re-interpretation of the traditional view of man which is based on the philosophy of Aristotle and the teachings of St. Thomas in particular.

The international colloquium where I introduced Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical approach was devoted to the theme “Soi et Autrui” (The Self and the Other) and organized by the International Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society in collaboration with the Swiss Philosophical Society. The session in which I made my presentation was presided over by Emmanuel Levinas. The Cardinal having been unable to attend in person, I had agreed to write a companion paper related to the contribution he had prepared for the colloquium under the title “Participation or Alienation?”¹ For this purpose, he had furnished me, in December 1974,² with the English text of his lecture on “The Personal Structure of Self-determination” which he had delivered at the international conference commemorating the 700th anniversary of the death of St. Thomas Aquinas,³ and with a typewritten French translation of the last two chapters of his book Osoba i czyn an English version of which was published – after his accession to the See of Peter – as Volume X of the series Analecta Husserliana under the title The Acting Person.⁴ In 1975, the philosophical writings of Karol Wojtyła were not yet widely known outside of Poland. As to my knowledge, the text of my lecture published in Volume VI of the Analecta Husserliana (1977) was the first secondary literature on the later Pope’s philosophy outside of Poland.⁵

I had consented to analyzing and presenting the then Cardinal’s ideas to a philosophical audience because of our joint adherence to the phenomenological school of thought. Both of us were active members of the World Phenomenology Institute headed by Professor Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, a former student of Roman Ingarden. (My first ever philosophical lecture I had delivered in September 1972 at a conference organized by the International Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society, an

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affiliate organization of the Institute, at St. John's University in New York. The topic of my presentation was “The ‘A Priori’ Moment of the Subject-Object Dialectic in Transcendental Phenomenology.”

It is obvious from this brief chronology that my interest in Wojtyła’s approach predates his election as Pope. While most interpreters of his philosophy were interested in his philosophical conception because he was the head of the Roman Catholic Church, my motivation was merely philosophical. Having dealt with his ideas well before he acceded to a position of dogmatic teaching, I was mainly — understandably, I guess — interested in how a man I knew as a genuine philosopher (and whose election I had never anticipated) would eventually redefine the office he had assumed and reinterpret traditional teachings of the Church along the lines of his philosophical convictions. In a certain sense, particularly as regards the general policies and positions of the Holy See, my hopes proved premature. I identified, however, a persistence of his original phenomenological approach — namely a consistent emphasis on the irreducible element in the human subject — in many of the pronouncements he made as head of the Roman-Catholic Church, particularly those dealing with social responsibility, and in what I would like to call his “cosmopolitan reinterpretation” of the papal mission.

Having said this, I would like to state that, as an academic philosopher, I shall not make any comments on issues of theology or church politics. These are neither my fields of competence nor interest. I shall not deal with Pope John Paul II’s theological work and shall comment on the “political” and global aspects of his pontificate only insofar as those are related to his philosophical — and in particular anthropological — approach which I was familiar with since before his papacy.

The phenomenological method having been the common denominator of our philosophical endeavours, I had concentrated in my first commentary on Karol Wojtyła’s approach on what I called, at the time, the “dialectic nature of self-comprehension” — and, for that matter, self-determination. Interpreting Wojtyła’s approach in the chapter entitled “Le ‘membre de la communauté’ et l’ ‘autrui’” (The “member of the community” and the “other”) of his philosophical opus magnum (yet unpublished in the English language), I characterized the other as “the indispensable counterpart of one’s own individuality,” emphasizing that the other “therefore constitutes the basis for a critical self-

8 Formulation according to the French translation furnished to me by the author. (Now to be found in part four ["Participation"] of the English version.)
10 The Dialectical Conception of Self-Determination, loc. cit., p. 77.
comprehension” that is at the roots of the autonomy (self-determination)\textsuperscript{11} of the human being in general. I related this to the dialectical structure of intentionality which Wojtyła had identified in human perception.

I was especially interested in his view of “participation” which he had outlined in his written contribution to the Fribourg colloquium made available to me in advance. The distinction made by him between the mere sociological phenomenon of a group of human beings and a community in the sense of an interdependent relationship – in which “the other” is part of my personal self-determination, i.e. is not perceived as a mere “object,” but may determine and correct my self-experience (identity) –, was exactly what I had aspired to work out in my hermeneutical approach towards what we call today the “dialogue of civilizations.” In a lecture on “The Cultural-philosophical Aspects of International Co-operation” delivered in March 1974 before the Royal Scientific Society in Amman (Jordan),\textsuperscript{13} I tried to explain the phenomenon of cultural identity in terms of the dialectic nature of consciousness as manifested in the interdependent relationship between the self and the other. Thus, what Wojtyła had called the “personal structure of self-determination,” in my system of cultural hermeneutics had been identified as basis of a philosophy of “cultural self-comprehension,” i.e. civilizational dialogue.\textsuperscript{14} This made me rather susceptible to an approach such as Wojtyła’s that was oriented towards a definition of subjectivity – or personal identity – in the sense of an interdependent relationship between ego and alter ego (which I had characterized as “dialectical” in the strict Hegelian sense\textsuperscript{15}).

In line with this common approach of ours, it was understandable that the then Cardinal of Kraków, in a letter dated 12 February 1975, had confirmed to me that the interpretation which I had advanced under the title “The Dialectical Conception of Self-Determination” was fully expressing his own intentions which he had outlined in his paper on “Participation or Alienation?”\textsuperscript{16} In the text of the published article (1977), he had acknowledged the co-operation that led to my writing a companion paper to his text.\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{12} Op. cit., p. 78.

\textsuperscript{13} Hans Köchler, Cultural-philosophical Aspects of International Cooperation, loc. cit.


\textsuperscript{15} In the context of cultural hermeneutics and personalistic anthropology such as the one advanced here this notion has nothing to do with the field of social theory covered by Marxist doctrine.

\textsuperscript{16} Carolus Cardinalis Wojtyła, Archiepiscopus Metropolita Cracoviensis, letter dated Kraków, 12 February 1975 (German) [in the author’s personal archive]: “… Only a limited amount of material was available to you as source of information on my conception; in view of this, your profound understanding of my conception deserves even higher respect …” (Trans. from the German original / H.K.)

Another contribution by Karol Wojtyła to phenomenological anthropology – and the theory of mind in general – was of special interest to me; it can be summarized under the heading of “phenomenological realism.” As I outlined in an article written for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1982), by modifying Husserl’s notion of intentionality – or re-positioning it in the context of realistic phenomenology – he was able to avoid the kind of ontological idealism in which the later Husserl had got entangled. In a treatise on Scheler’s phenomenological ethics, written for the Third Conference of the International Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society in Montreal (1974), he had asked whether the notion of intentionality, being limited to the rational level of eidetic insight, can “do justice to man as a person” and had explained that, in turning “halfway back to Husserl” when applying the phenomenological method, he “went beyond him in the analysis of the person.”

In The Acting Person he introduces an interesting conceptual distinction between “knowledge” and “consciousness.” While he defines knowledge in the sense of an intentional act – being directed towards real objects of perception –, consciousness is characterized by him as a mere “mirroring,” i.e. a passive “reflection” of the processes occurring within the “acting person.” This form of self-reflexion, however, is identified as a fundamental condition of human self-realization. In his analysis, the mirroring function of consciousness is “closely related to self-knowledge,” allowing us “to gain an objective awareness of the good or evil that we are the agents of in any particular action.” In a further creative transformation of Husserlian phenomenology, he distinguishes between “subjectivity” (as a phenomenon of reflexion) and “subjectiveness” (rooted in the pre-reflexive unity of life), thus acknowledging that “[c]onsciousness does not constitute the inner structure of the human dynamism itself.” These elements of a “realistic” anthropology, based on a concrete phenomenological approach – as distinct from the rather abstract Husserlian theory of “reduction” that has led the latter into a form of absolute idealism –, have been, in my personal analysis, the focal point also of the later Pope’s philosophical identity and social teachings.

Allow me to look back one more time at the genesis of my hermeneutical approach towards civilizational dialogue, which had the same – phenomenological – roots as my interest in the

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22 The Acting Person, pp. 31f.
philosophical foundations of anthropology, documented in Karol Wojtyła’s approach of the “acting person.” In both instances, human identity – and thus self-determination in the anthropological sense – is perceived in terms of a dialectical relationship between the self and the other, revealing the irreducible element of subjectivity as such. The notion of “self-determination” in the sense of the irreducibility of the human subject, linked with the subject’s dignity and inalienable rights in the individual as well as the collective sense, has been an essential element of my theory of cultural self-comprehension and later became the paramount feature of my efforts in the philosophy of democracy and the reflections on global justice following from it. In a two-month tour around the globe in March–April 1974, I set out to promote the idea of civilizational dialogue in the sense of what I called, at the time, the “dialectic of cultural consciousness,” and held preparatory consultations for an international conference on “The Cultural Self-comprehension of Nations” which I was to organize in Innsbruck in July 1974 and which, for the first time in that post-colonial era, evoked the theme of a “dialogue among civilizations” as basis of global peace, laying out the hermeneutical framework of such a dialogue. In my analysis which I discussed, in the course of that voyage, among others with the late Yussef El-Sebai, then Minister of Culture of Egypt, and the Founder President of Senegal, Léopold Sédar Senghor, the philosopher of “négritude,” cultural self-comprehension – and thus human identity in the broadest sense, including the human being’s social relations – was based on the dialectical structure of human consciousness (reflection).

I further built on this approach when devising the structure of an international symposion on “The Concept of Monotheism in Islam and Christianity” in 1981. On a personal note: For preparatory meetings on the symposion I arrived in Rome – in the early morning of 14 May 1981 – to the news of the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II. The symposion was eventually held in Rome in November of that year with the participation of a representative of the Holy See and a special message from Cardinal Franz König of Vienna; in the final document, the participants called for further dialogue among the two great monotheistic religions as basis of global peace.

My direct philosophical co-operation with Karol Wojtyła had ended before that date, however. It was based on the participation in the international phenomenological movement (the International Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society and later the World Phenomenology Institute), in

particular the academic colloquia and conferences organized during the 1970s. As indicated earlier, I did not deal with “the philosophy of the Pope” nor with his religious views or teachings; the co-operation was exclusively situated within a philosophical context, namely that of the phenomenological school. At that period of time (during the 1970s), I was concentrating on epistemological questions of phenomenology, trying to uncover contradictions and ontological inconsistencies in Husserl’s transcendental approach and advocating a realistic phenomenological concept as opposed to Husserl’s idealistic turn. I considered the ontological idealism of the later Husserl as a position that had fallen back behind the original achievements that were yielded by the implementation of his slogan “zu den Sachen selbst” (or: “zurück zum Gegenstand”/ “back to the thing itself”). In that regard, my efforts were in line with Karol Wojtyła’s orientation who identified, in the draft preface to the English edition of his work Osoba i czyn, the human being as subject as “the most interesting ‘thing itself’.” Subsequently, I had dealt with the phenomenological foundations of anthropology and the interdependent relationship between anthropology and ontology. Thus, the nexus between our two phenomenological approaches was the exploration of the transcendental status of the human subject beyond the paradigm of (ontological) idealism and outside the realm of mere “objectivization” of the human being as part of nature. This connection has been aptly described by Rocco Buttiglione in his authoritative philosophical biography of John Paul II. He summarizes my reading of Wojtyła’s position – in the sense of realist phenomenology – in the following terms:

Wojtyła accepts that the traditional, nonphenomenological point of departure of anthropology objectifies man; his own point of departure is a phenomenological description of experience. While Wojtyła objects the cosmological point of departure as inadequate in anthropology, he does not limit anthropology to phenomenology, and points to a transphenomenological approach for a complete anthropology. Wojtyła rejects Husserl’s idealistic turn, which leads to a subjectivist reflection and absolutization of consciousness.

My first lecture on Karol Wojtyła’s phenomenological conception in Fribourg in 1975 was followed by another presentation entitled “La fenomenologia del Cardinale Karol Wojtyła. Sul problema d’un’antropologia a base fenomenologica” at the Annual Conference of the Italian Section of the International Husserl and

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32 The Acting Person, p. xiv. (Translated from the Polish original by Professor M. K. Dziewanowski.)


Phenomenological Research Society in Viterbo, Italy, in February 1979. After that meeting, our group was received by John Paul II in the Vatican. In a personal conversation, he assured me that he will always remain committed to the phenomenological movement and consider himself a phenomenologist; but he also made clear that he won’t be able to take an active part in the debates of the phenomenological community any longer. Irrespective of his disengagement from the daily philosophical work due to the assumption of his high office in 1978, he remained loyal to the personalistic philosophy of his phenomenological period – as I was able to observe during the long years of his pontificate and will explain later in more detail.

One of the most concise elaborations of his phenomenological anthropology can be found in his article on “Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man” which appeared in 1978. (The text was originally presented at the “Paris Colloquium” in June 1975.) In his analysis of the human subject, Wojtyła makes clear that in view of what has been achieved in phenomenology, “we can no longer treat man only as an objective being,” i.e. as a mere object. He critically refers to what he calls the “cosmological” understanding of man – which he identifies with the traditional “metaphysical” position of philosophy – as the key factor that has prevented philosophy from grasping the irreducible nature of the human being as subject. By stressing subjectivity as “synonym of all that is irreducible in man,” he clearly challenges the predominance of the Aristotelian paradigm in traditional anthropology (in the sense of the definition “homo est animal rationale”), although he leaves open the question “whether the ‘cosmological’ type of understanding man and the ‘personalistic’ one ultimately exclude each other?” His personalistic position implies – as we explained in the 1982 article in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research – the “essential irreducibility of personal self-realization to constant factors of the world of objects, i.e., the world as described by the natural sciences.”

For me as a philosopher who was interested in identifying new paradigms resulting from the phenomenological method in the sense of “transcendental realism,” this had far-reaching implications for philosophical thought within the realm of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy, the predominant

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35 The text has been published in La Nuova Critica, Rome, Vol. 52 (1979), pp. 69-76.
37 Fifth International Phenomenology Conference held by the International Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society, 12-15 June 1975.
41 Hans Köchler, The Phenomenology of Karol Wojtyła: On the Problem of the Phenomenological Foundation of Anthropology, p. 333.
orientation within the Roman-Catholic church. Wojtyła himself addressed the issue rather directly in his article for the Paris Colloquium by stating that the thinker who seeks – by philosophical methods – the “ultimate truth” about the human being “does not limit himself to ‘purely metaphysical ground’.” In the handwritten draft of the author’s preface to the English edition of his main philosophical work *The Acting Person*, he elaborates further on the theme. He characterizes the personalistic-phenomenological approach as “completely new in relation to traditional philosophy,” making clear that he subsumes to that category “the pre-Cartesian philosophy and above all the heritage of Aristotle, and, among the Catholic schools of thought, of St. Thomas Aquinas.” He further characterizes his anthropological undertaking in *The Acting Person* as “an attempt at reinterpreting certain formulations proper to this whole philosophy,” while acknowledging that he “owes everything to the systems of metaphysics, of anthropology, and of Aristotelian-Thomistic ethics on the one hand, and to phenomenology, above all in Scheler’s interpretation, and through Scheler’s critique also to Kant, on the other hand.” In our analysis, it still cannot be clearly determined – as far as a strictly philosophical approach is concerned –, how those competing schools of thought (with different, if not mutually exclusive notions of humanity) were reconciled in the Pope’s world view.

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45 Ibid.
In view of the positions adopted by him on the nature of the human being, it was not far-fetched for philosophical observers and intellectuals versed in Roman-Catholic doctrine to expect – in the course of Karol Wojtyła’s election in 1978 – a modification or re-orientation of Church teaching away from Aristotelianism and Thomism with their “objectivistic” world view and anthropology, identified as such by the pontifex himself – albeit in his pre-pontifical philosophical life –, towards an approach that is based on the irreducible character of the human subject. I am well aware of the dispute that followed Cardinal Wojtyła’s accession to the See of Peter about his philosophy’s phenomenological orientation and its possible impact on his interpretation – or re-interpretation – of Catholic doctrine, namely the teachings of Thomism. I followed the controversy around the publication of the English edition of Osoba i czyn – with Church officials allegedly challenging the authenticity of the English text – from a “philosophical distance,” being aware of what I had heard from the author’s own mouth. What has been said about the English edition’s excessively “phenomenologizing” both Wojtyła’s language and ideas must, thus, be seen in the wider context of Church politics – in a constellation where a philosophical author suddenly finds himself in the position of pontifex maximus, i.e. as supreme authority in all issues of Catholic doctrine. Only a non-political, genuinely hermeneutical approach will help us to establish a fair and balanced interpretation and evaluation of his philosophical position which, according to my impression, did not suddenly vanish on the day of his election.

The series of phenomenological papers which Wojtyła had published in the Analecta Husserliana during the 1970s provides adequate guidance, at least for the philosopher. In the (official) Preface to the English edition of Osoba i czyn the author had himself declared his intention of “reversing the post-Cartesian attitude toward man … by approaching him through action,” referring to the work of Max Scheler – one of the main representatives of the realistic school of phenomenology – as “a major influence upon his reflection.” He had stated his “full approval” to the changes proposed by the English editor and incorporated into the definitive version of the book. In a written communication to

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48 Buttiglione, op. cit., p. 117, fn. 1.
49 The Acting Person, p. viii.
50 Ibid.
me which dealt with the presentation of his paper “Participation or Alienation?” – in his absence – at the Fribourg colloquium of 1975, he had also expressed his confidence in the editor of the English version.52

Irrespective of the implications of these interpretive questions for Church politics, one systematic problem of Wojtyła’s phenomenological anthropology will have to be addressed more specifically, namely that of the very meaning of the (human) subject. Is it appropriate to assume, as Buttiglione suggests, that Wojtyła’s usage of the term in the original Polish version essentially evokes the Greek meaning of υποκείµενον (subjectum) as “the metaphysical subject to which all attributions regarding the person refer”?53 Can one really say – as Buttiglione does – that the phenomenological interpretation of the subject “reduces” the importance of the υποκείµενον?54 If one interprets Wojtyła’s usage of the terms “subject” and “subjectivity” in the context of his prepontifical philosophical writings one can hardly read his reservations towards a “purely metaphysical ground” of the understanding of man55 as confirming a commitment to the traditional metaphysical definition of subjectum. To the contrary, in papers specially written for phenomenological meetings – such as the one entitled “Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man”56 – Wojtyła made it abundantly clear that he was mainly concerned with the “concreteness of the existence of man, that is, … the reality of the conscious subject”57 which he understood as the irreducible element in man. While explaining, in The Acting Person, that “[t]he subjectiveness present in both man’s acting and in what happens in him, implies or refers to an ontologically subsequent factor as its necessary condition,”58 his philosophical endeavour is far from building on the “objectivistic” notion of the metaphysical subject in the sense of Aristotelian philosophy. When he speaks, in the context of The Acting Person, of “a structural ontological nucleus that would account for the fact itself of man being the subject or the fact that the subject is a being,”59 this formulation cannot be construed in the sense of υποκείµενον in its traditional metaphysical meaning. This is becoming even more obvious in the Postscript to The Acting Person where the author unambiguously states: “… our aim was never to build a theory of the person as a being, to develop a metaphysical conception of man.”60 In my own interpretation of his approach I have repeatedly tried to

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52 Letter of 12 February 1975, loc. cit. (see fn. 16).
53 Buttiglione, op. cit., p. 117.
54 Ibid.
55 Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man, p. 114.
56 The text was written for the 5th International Phenomenology Conference in Paris (12-15 June 1975) and published in Analecta Husserliana, Vol. VII (1978).
58 The Acting Person, p. 72.
59 Ibid.
clarify in what sense and up to what extent Wojtyła tries to distance his personalistic anthropology from a purely “metaphysical” and objectivistic approach.\footnote{Cf. Hans Köchler, “Die phänomenologisch-anthropologische Grundlage der Anthropologie von Karol Wojtyła,” in: \textit{Salzburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie}, Vol. 25 (1980), pp. 157-163. See also the publications listed in the Annex to this paper.}

Even some of his pontifical texts appear to confirm this phenomenological – or personalistic – interpretation of “subject” and “subjectivity.” Samuel Gregg has convincingly argued that Wojtyła’s prepontifical philosophical texts had an influence particularly on the social encyclicals promulgated by him as \textit{pontifex maximus}.\footnote{Samuel Gregg, \textit{Challenging the Modern World: John Paul II/Karol Wojtyła and the Development of Catholic Social Teaching.} Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 1999.}

The encyclical \textit{Laborem exercens}\footnote{Iоannes Paulus PP. II, \textit{Laborem exercens. To His Venerable Brothers in the Episcopate, to the Priests, to the Religious Families, to the sons and daughters of the Church, and to all Men and Women of good will on Human Work on the ninetieth anniversary of \textit{Rerum Novarum}, 14 September 1981. \textit{Rerum Novarum} was promulgated by Pope Leo XIII on 15 May 1891: \textit{Leonis XIII P. M. Acta}, XI, Romae 1892, pp. 97-144.]} is a case in point. The distinction introduced in Chapter II (“Work and Man”) between work in the \textit{objective} and \textit{subjective} sense resembles very much the distinction made in his phenomenological writings between the human being in the objective and subjective dimension. Apart from the theological context in which any papal encyclical is being situated, he draws, in this particular text, the practical conclusions from his earlier phenomenological analysis of the nature of the human being; or one may say, more cautiously, the text of this encyclical is perfectly in tune with his earlier phenomenological approach. By describing the person as “a subjective being capable of acting in a planned and rational way … and with a tendency to self-realization” and emphasizing the “pre-eminence of the subjective meaning of work over the objective one” (Art. 6: \textit{Work in the Subjective Sense: Man as the Subject of Work}),\footnote{Text quoted according to the official English version released by the Holy See: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091981_laborem-exercens_en.html.} the encyclical resembles in its conceptual approach the phenomenological description of man in \textit{The Acting Person} and in Wojtyła’s contributions to the phenomenological conferences referred to earlier. The encyclical’s critique of capitalism can equally be related to the personalistic philosophy of the Pope’s prepontifical writings. The phraseology reminds the reader of earlier texts on the irreducible character of the human being and the self-determination of man being rooted in his inalienable dignity as a subject (person): “… the error of early capitalism can be repeated wherever man is in a way treated on the same level as the whole complex of the material means of production, as an instrument and not in accordance with the true dignity of his work – that is to say, where he is not treated as subject …”\footnote{Art. 7 (“A Threat to the Right Order of Values”).}
Similarly, the encyclical *Veritatis splendor*, when, *inter alia*, reflecting upon the dignity of the human person, reasoning about the true meaning of self-determination, and speaking of heteronomy as “a form of alienation,” evokes Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical-anthropological convictions. The ductus of the argumentation quite obviously resembles the style of his philosophical *opus magnum*.67

Many other texts of his papacy document that Karol Wojtyła’s pontifical views on social justice – including his critical assessment of globalization – are fully consistent with his earlier philosophical convictions concerning the dignity of man as subject that is not reducible to the realm of objects. His personalistic commitment to the building of a just world order, although – as far as the papal texts are concerned – primarily situated within a theological context, is clearly visible in the encyclical *Sollicitudo rei socialis* (1987) where – in the chapter entitled “Survey of the Contemporary World” – he states that the Church’s social doctrine “adopts a critical attitude towards both liberal capitalism and Marxist collectivism.” He poses the question: “in what way and to what extent are these two systems capable of changes and updatings such as to favor or promote a true and integral development of individuals and peoples in modern society?” Very much in tune with his approach in *The Acting Person* and with his anthropological notion of self-determination, he emphasizes, in the concluding chapter, that “[h]uman beings are totally free only when they are completely themselves, in the fullness of their rights and duties.” Similarly, in his paper for the Fribourg Colloquium (1975), he, as a philosopher, had referred to self-determination revealing “the freedom of the will … in the simplest and likewise fullest manner,” allowing us to designate that “through which everyone is his own I.” In the encyclical’s analysis, what is at stake – apart from all questions of social wealth and material development – is “the dignity of the human person;” he acknowledges, however, that “the present situation does not seem to correspond to this dignity.” His emphasis of a just global order, based on the inalienable rights of man, is further underlined by the encyclical’s repeated references to the virtue of solidarity and mutual human interdependence.

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67 Cf. esp. Articles 50 and 65.
69 Ibid.
71 *Sollicitudo rei socialis*, Art. 46, Par. 4.
72 *Participation or Alienation?*, p. 63.
73 *Sollicitudo rei socialis*, Art. 47, Par. 4.
74 Ibid.
In a similar vein, John Paul II spoke repeatedly of the ethically ambiguous character of globalization, making clear his commitment to a world order that is oriented towards the needs of the human being. In the document *Ecclesia in America* (1999), he warns, while acknowledging positive consequences resulting from increased production and efficiency, that “if globalization is ruled merely by the laws of the market applied to suit the powerful, the consequences cannot but be negative.” Among those he mentions the “absolutizing of the economy,” “the growing distance between rich and poor,” and unfair competition between the developing and the industrialized countries.

It has been argued that Karol Wojtyła’s preponficial philosophical writings have in turn been influenced by catholic magisterial texts. According to Gregory R. Beabout, *The Acting Person* can be interpreted as a meditation on human action inspired by the Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et spes*, which was promulgated by Paul VI as an official document of the Second Vatican Council (1965). Interestingly, this interpretation is confirmed by Wojtyła’s own brief reference – in a note in *The Acting Person* – to the circumstances under which the book was written. He confides that, while writing *Osoba i czyn* (the first, Polish version of *The Acting Person*), he attended the Second Vatican Council, and recalls that his participation in the proceedings “stimulated and inspired his thinking about the person.” In this connection, he further states that the Council’s Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et spes* “not only brings to the forefront the person and his calling but also asserts the belief in his transcendent nature …” Some of the language of the Constitution is indeed very similar to the approach in *The Acting Person*, but also to that in Wojtyła’s more specific contributions to phenomenological anthropology. This becomes particularly obvious in regard to the wording of Art. 3 of the Constitution’s Preface: “For the human person deserves to be preserved; human society deserves to be renewed. Hence the focal point of our total presentation will be man himself, whole and entire, body and soul, heart and conscience, mind and will.” Article 35 of the Constitution states, *inter alia*, that “when a man works he not only alters things and society, he develops himself as well. … A man is more precious for what he is than for what he

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76 Loc. cit.


78 *The Acting Person*, p. 302, fn. 9.

79 Ibid.

has.” The first sentence of this quotation is almost mirrored by what Wojtyła refers to in his article on *The Personal Structure of Self-Determination* (1974) where he speaks about the human will and explains that every act of will effects a modification of the human subject as well.⁸¹

While acknowledging that *The Acting Person* – and Wojtyła’s anthropology in general – articulates the basic humanistic aspirations of *Gaudium et spes*,⁸² we do not go as far as Samuel Gregg who obviously wants to see Wojtyła’s philosophical conception absorbed by the theological tradition of Catholicism. For him, John Paul II’s pre-pontifical writings merely acknowledge “insights into the truth which emerge outside the Church,” using language that is familiar to contemporary audiences,⁸³ as if the writing of *The Acting Person* was a mere tactical move by a theologian and Church politician. It is no wonder that in such a narrow hermeneutical context, lacking proper understanding for Wojtyła as a philosopher, “*The Acting Person* reads like neo-Thomism couched in Husserlian language.”⁸⁴

Having witnessed the development of his anthropological approach in the period preceding his election (particularly from 1974 onwards) through the joint participation in the activities of the World Phenomenology Institute – at the time when I also served as member of the Editorial Board of the *Phenomenology Information Bulletin* –, I cannot but distance myself from a tendency of interpretation that, while being subordinated to the realm of theology and official teaching, is alien to philosophy and its strictly independent approach. The Pope’s own brief statement to our phenomenological group on 26 February 1979 (to which I referred earlier) is sufficient proof of my interpretation.⁸⁵ Compared to Gregg’s evaluation, Rocco Buttiglione’s biography⁸⁶ is considerably more balanced, doing justice to the later Pope’s philosophical aspirations that were definitely not of a mere apologetic nature.

Wojtyła’s dealing with the question of “alienation” – a basic concept of Marxist philosophy – in the years preceding his papacy is further proof of his independent philosophical mind (which was also at work in the writing of encyclicals such as *Laborem exercens*). While pointing to the *limitations* of the Marxist

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⁸³ *Challenging the Modern World*, p. 62.
⁸⁴ Ibid.
⁸⁵ This interpretation got even more credence by what has been reported on a statement made by John Paul II on 22 March 2003 to a visiting delegation of the World Phenomenology Institute, presenting him with a copy of the new encyclopedia “Phenomenology Worldwide.” According to Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka’s recollection, published in *boston.com*, he “described phenomenology as ‘an attitude of intellectual charity toward man and the world and, for the believer, toward God.’ Although we may long to discover the true meaning and ultimate foundation of human, personal, and social existence, we’ll never do so until we’ve learned to view reality, and one another, without any prejudice or schematisms.” (Quoted according to *Ephilosopher*, www.ephilosopher.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=413, 6 April 2003.)
notion of alienation (insofar as Marxist doctrine suggests that “man is alienated by his own creations,” including religion), he was determined to put the concept “to good account” so that it would help “in the analysis of the human reality.” Thus, he integrated the concept into his phenomenological anthropology defining “alienation” as the “negation of participation.” According to his understanding, alienation cannot exclusively be linked to the world of human creations and the production of social structures, but is intrinsically related “to the place of the human being as a personal subject in this world.” In his critical – and at the same time productive – anthropological review of the discourse on alienation he paid tribute to “contemporary Marxists” such as Adam Schaff who were drawing attention to the limits of a narrow materialistic interpretation and advocating a humanistic review of this essential element of Marxist doctrine. Thus, taking up a fundamental notion of Marxist philosophy, he was able to reshape it by interpreting it in a phenomenological context, namely as an essential element of the conditio humana. This led him to the conclusion that “participation or alienation remains the central problem of our age.”

Because of his deep commitment to the “human being in action” and his efforts at understanding the intricate structures of human self-determination, transcending merely metaphysical notions of “subject” and “object” and reaching out to a comprehensive anthropology that is based on Erlebnis in the phenomenological sense (“experience lived through”), Karol Wojtyła has continuously expanded the scope of phenomenology and gone beyond the confines of an abstract transcendental (subjectivist) epistemology – as in the case of Edmund Husserl’s emphasis on ἐποχή – towards a comprehensive system of practical philosophy. After 1978, this approach – consistently documented in his

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87 Participation or Alienation?, p. 72.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
95 See, for instance, his article Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man, pp. 110f. (Chapter 3: “Experience lived through” as an element of interpretation.”)
96 He made it abundantly clear that his method in phenomenological anthropology was not the one of Husserl’s ἐποχή. Commenting on the method applied in The Acting Person, he writes that his approach “does not entail that the essence is distilled and separated from actual existence, so characteristic for Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological epoché. Thus this study does not follow the principles of a strictly eidetic method …” (The Acting Person, p. 300, fn. 4.)
97 My personal philosophical development has been somewhat in tune with the tendency inherent in this approach, centering on the exploration of the intricate mechanisms of the “acting person.” In my endeavours in practical philosophy, following the phenomenological research during the 1970s, the irreducible element of the human subject is related to the subject’s autonomy which I perceived as the transcultural foundation of human rights. This brought me into legal philosophy and motivated, inter alia, my efforts at reinterpreting the traditional system of international law on the basis of human rights as basic norms not only for any domestic legal system, but for the relations between states as subjects of international law. (The Principles of International Law and Human Rights. The Compatibility of Two Normative Systems. Studies in International Relations, V. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1981.) One further step in my efforts at outlining the political-legal implications of a personalistic philosophy such as the one I had advocated in my phenomenological writings was the formulation of an alternative paradigm of democracy to be
prepontifical writings – has been transformed into what I would like to call the “applied philosophy” of the papal encyclicals, *Laborem exercens* being the paramount example.

Through his emphasis on the concrete human being, Karol Wojtyła substantially contributed to the development of realistc phenomenology in the sense defined by Max Scheler and Roman Ingarden, combining a commitment to the irreducible nature of the human subject with an acknowledgment of objective reality, bearing in mind that the phenomenological method is “in the service of transphenomenological cognition.” The core issue of his emphasis on phenomenological anthropology has always been the one outlined in his contribution to the Fribourg Colloquium of 1975: namely how the “I” constitutes himself in relation to the “other,” i.e. the relation of the concrete “I” to all human beings. According to his conception, “[t]hey are not only ‘other’ in their relation to the ‘I,’ but each one of them is at the same time a ‘different I.’” His personalistic-phenomenological approach enabled him to reach out to mankind as such, an attitude he brought to hitherto unknown perfection in his global pilgrimage as *pontifex maximus*, addressing men and women of virtually all cultures and civilizations. Thus, having remained loyal to his philosophical origins and true to his commitment to the dignity of the human being, John Paul II has proven the universal mission of phenomenology even in a realm that goes far beyond philosophical reasoning.


96 *Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man*, p. 113.
97 *Participation or Alienation?*, p. 64.
98 This fundamental orientation can also be discerned in some of his speeches on inter-religious dialogue such as the Papal Address at the Omayyad Mosque in Damascus on 6 May 2001, in which he said that „*[i]nterreligious dialogue is most effective when it springs from the experience of ‘living with each other’ from day to day within the same community and culture.”* (Quoted according to the English version published at http://www.catholic-forum.com/saints/pope0264qr.htm.)
Annex:

Writings by the author on the philosophical conception of Karol Wojtyła


